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Abstract
The interpretation of the Supreme Court that the exclusion clause of unlicensed driving cannot be applied
to the case where there is consent of the approved insured only may leave room for criticism. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court neglected the principle of the insurance law on the exclusion clause of
unlicensed driving. The interpretation of it shall be interpreted more flexibly. Accordingly, as regards the
case where the control or management of the insured was possible, it shall be interpreted it as including
all situations with the cases under the control or management of the registered insured, approved insured
and persons driving vehicles for them. In other words, if unlicensed driving was done under the express or
implied consent of the registered insured, approved insured or drivers for them, the exclusion clause of
unlicensed driving should be applied, depending on the detailed situation. The reason is that they all are
in the position of insured under the automobile insurance policy, and persons in such positions would
have the obligation not to permit driving by an unlicensed driver. According to the current provisions of
Article 732-2 and Article 633 of Commercial Law, it has to be interpreted as an imperative provision that
does not permit exclusion of the insurer’s liability on grossly negligent accidents in personal accident
insurance. However, there is a need of re-review of Article 633 that makes the relatively imperative
provision for Article 732-2 of Commercial Law due to several problems including the possibility of
unconstitutionality. Namely, unlike the current legal provision, the relatively imperative regulation should
be made only in cases needed individually for each relevant article and shall review the ways to exclude
Article 732-2 of Commercial Law from the subject of relative imperative provision.

I.  Introduction
In insurance contract law or an insurance policy, in the event of an occurrence of a
certain cause arising in relation to an insured event, the insurer will not be liable for
payment of the insured amount. This is referred to as the prerequisite for exclusion. In
general, when a policyholder or insured party causes a loss, with intent, to another
person, the insurer is not obligated for payment of the insured amount.1) The rationale
for the exclusion is that the intentional infliction of loss conflicts with the material
requirement that the event must be an uncertain insured event. This is also related to
the issue of ‘insurance fraud’ or ‘moral hazard’. The requirement of ‘intent’ indicated
here is the mental condition for undertaking a certain action(s), knowing that a specific
result would occur because of his/her action. This does not necessarily mean the intent
to obtain the insured amount.2) However, the responsibility of loss compensation under
the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act or the Civil Act still
remains, even for an intentional event.  
Article 659 of the Korean Commercial Act defines that, if the insured events have
occurred due to acts of the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary, which are
‘intentional or grossly negligent’, the insurer is not liable for payment of the insured
amount. On the other hand, the ‘Bodily Injury Liability I’ of the Korean Automobile
Insurance Policy excludes ‘gross negligence’ in relation to the conditions for
exclusion. The reason for such exclusion of gross negligence is that it is different from
an intentional act committed without fortuity, and when the loss caused by gross
negligence is compensated, it is not contrary to the principle of the insurance contract.
In other words, under the Bodily Injury Liability I, compulsory insurance with
characteristics of social insurance, the insurer has compensation liability on loss caused
by gross negligence of the insured, and accordingly, driving while unlicensed or
intoxicated is not defined as a condition for exclusion. 
Under such a situation, the exclusion clauses for unlicensed driving or driving
while intoxicated, which cause particular problems are applicable to the cases of
liability insurance, Bodily Injury Liability II and personal accident insurance of an
automobile insurance contract.
1) Clause 1 of Article 3 of Automobile Insurance Policy 
2) Supreme Court Decision: Mar. 9, 2001, 2000 Da 67020 
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II.  Exclusion Clauses for Unlicensed Driving or Driving While 
Intoxicated in Bodily Injury Liability II
A.  Exclusion Clauses for Unlicensed Driving 
1. Policy Provision 
Section 6 of Clause 1 of Article 11 of the Automobile Insurance Policy states that
the insurer shall not be required to compensate for losses incurred from accidents
occurring by the insured himself who was driving unlicensed or who allows a driver of
an insured automobile to perform an unlicensed operation of an automobile with the
express or implied consent of the insured. 
2. Concept of Unlicensed Driving 
Unlicensed driving is driving an automobile without a driver’s license, which is
required under the Traffic Road Act. The act of unlicensed driving is a criminal act and
is subject to criminal sanction. The Supreme Court held that driving while one’s
driving privilege is suspended can also be treated as unlicensed driving.3) Therefore,
regardless of whether the driver has sufficient driving skills required for receiving a
driver’s license, the standard of the decision is whether the action is in violation of law. 
Cancellation of a driver’s license shall not be valid unless a legitimate notice of
public announcement has been made under the Enforcement Decree of the Traffic
Road Act. Therefore, an accident which occurs during the period where the person  has
not yet received the notice of revocation of the driver’s license is not applicable to the
unlicensed driving under the policy.4) It is irrelevant whether the driver knew that he
was driving without a license since the driver’s license is suspended or revoked in
accordance with the proper legal procedure. Accordingly, even if the driver does not
know that he is driving without a license, the policy of exclusion of unlicensed driving
may be applied.5)
3) Supreme Court Decision; Mar. 9, 1993, 92 Da 38928; Supreme Court Decision; Oct. 10, 1997, 96 Da 19079 
4) Supreme Court Decision; May 11, 1993, 92 Da 2530; Supreme Court Decision; Mar. 28, 1989, 88 Do 1738 
5) Supreme Court Decision; Mar. 27, 1998, 97 Da 6308 
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The Supreme Court held that the validity of the driver’s license becomes effective
when the driver’s license is issued by the Commissioner General of the Regional
Police Agency and when the applicant is qualified to receive it. In such a case, whether
the applicant is in a condition to receive the driver’s license is determined on the basis
of the date listed on the driver’s license, unless there are other special circumstances.6)
In addition, a driver who holds a 2nd class license but operates a vehicle that is
designated to be driven with a 1st class license, such person is also guilty of unlicensed
driving. If a foreigner without an international driver’s license issued by his/her own
country operates a vehicle after one year from the date of entry into the foreign
country-even with an international driver’s license-or operates a commercial vehicle,
he/she is also guilty of unlicensed driving. In the meantime, there is a license to
practice driving. When a person with a provisional license wishes to practice driving,
he/she must be accompanied by a person who has had a driver’s license for at least 2
years.7) On the issue of whether driving in violation of such a license requirement is
applicable to unlicensed driving, the provisional license has to be the right type of
driver’s license. And if a certain qualifying person is not practicing according to the
Road Traffic Act, it is only a cause for the revocation of his/her license, but it shall not
be deemed unlicensed driving.8)
3. Characteristics of Exclusion Provision of Unlicensed Driving and Causation 
(Applicable to the Case of Driving While Intoxicated)
a)  Characteristics of Exclusion Clauses of Unlicensed Driving 
The conditions for the insurance exclusions are generally divided into those for the
recognized policy and those under the pertinent laws. For exclusions under the policy,
the conditions are further classified into Exceptions and Exclusions. The former
exclusion is in relation to the cause of an insured event and the latter is completely
excluded from the scope of the risk of the insured event. However, these two are not
6) Supreme Court Decision; Jan. 21, 1997, 96 Da 40127; Supreme Court Decision; June 28, 1996, 96 Nu 4992;
Supreme Court Decision; June 13, 1995, 94 Da 1139 
7) Article 26-2 of Enforcement Decree of the Traffic Road Act 
8) Supreme Court Decision; Apr. 10, 2001, 2000 Do 5540 
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strictly distinguishable  in actual practice. 
Depending on the characteristics of the condition for exclusion of unlicensed
driving with respect to the categories of Exclusion or Exception, the interpretation of
the effectiveness of the condition of the exclusion for unlicensed driving differs greatly.
If the condition of the exclusion for unlicensed driving is classified as Exclusion, the
effectiveness of the condition for the exclusion for unlicensed driving is readily
recognized, and it does not require the existence of causation between the unlicensed
driving and losses. The Supreme Court appears to interpret the condition of the
exclusion of unlicensed driving as a cause for excluding it from the coverage not on
the basis that the cause of the accident is unlicensed driving, but on the basis of the
significance of the violation of law by virtue of the driver’s being unlicensed at the
time of occurrence of the accident.9) Accordingly, the attitude of the Supreme Court
shows that the characteristic of the condition of the exclusion of unlicensed driving is
an Exclusion. 
On the other hand, if the foregoing is looked upon as an Exception, there are
divided opinions as to the effectiveness of the exclusion of unlicensed driving. There
are some bases for upholding the ineffectiveness of the exclusion of unlicensed
driving; first, the insured event is not required to be in violation of law against loss for
insurance purposes; second, automobile liability insurance is aimed at compensating
the results of an act that is committed in violation of law; third, the policyholder who
entered into a comprehensive automobile insurance contract may be excluded from
criminal prosecution depending on the situation; and, lastly, it is unjust to provide
immunity to the insurer simply on the sole basis of unlicensed driving, considering that
unlicensed driving is not a criminal act but a simple administrative matter.10)
Considering unlicensed driving, the act itself is an element that increases the
possibility of the insured event. This undeniably brings a great change in the
homogeneity of the risk among the participants in an insurance contract. Under such
an objective, interpreting the characteristics of the exclusion for unlicensed driving as
an Exclusion would be appropriate to the principles under the insurance contract. 
9) Supreme Court Decision Mar. 9, 1993, 92 Da 38928 
10) Su-Seok Maeng, A study of the condition for the exceptions and exclusions in automobile insurance policies,
Ph.D Thesis, Dept of Law, Chungnam National University, Korea, 1996, pp. 79; Won-Kyu Rhyu, Insurer’s liability
in unlicensed or driving while intoxicated, in Contemporary issues in insurance law (Seung-Kyu Yang ed., 2000,
Seoul) pp. 442 
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b)  Issue of Causation 
i.  Courts’ Decisions 
For the requirement of causation between the unlicensed driving and the accident, a
lower court held that the insurer’s liability is excluded only in the case of the existence of
causation between the unlicensed driving and the accident.11) However, the Supreme
Court overturned this decision and recognized the exclusion of the insurer’s liability even
in the case of lack of causation between the unlicensed driving and an insured accident.12)
ii.  Opposing Opinion on the Decision 
In regards to this Supreme Court decision, it can be criticized on the basis that, first,
it is not reasonable to exclude the insurer’s liability even for an accident that absolutely
has no causal link to the unlicensed driving. Secondly, even though the Court believes
that it is difficult to prove causation between unlicensed driving and an accident, there
may be criticism of the exclusion of the insurer’s liability based only upon the fact that
the action was one of unlicensed driving even when cases clearly show a lack of
causation. Following this opinion, it points to Article 65313) of the Commercial Law
and its proviso in Article 655 14) for a way to resolve the problem of proving causation.
In other words, unlicensed driving is a violation of the obligation of risk management,
and the insurer who knew the violation of the risk management obligation with
unlicensed driving shall cancel the insurance contract within the prescribed time to
11) Seoul High Court Decision 89 Na 19301 
12) Supreme Court Decision; June 22, 1990, 89 Daka 32965 
13) Article 653 Increases of Risks due to Intention or Gross Negligence of Policyholder, etc. and Termination of
Contract If, during the cover period, the possibility of the occurrence of insured events has been substantially altered
or increased intentionally or by gross negligence of the policyholder, of the insured, or of the beneficiary, the insurer
may request an increase in the premium or terminate the contract within one month after it becomes aware of the fact. 
14) Article 655 Termination of Contract and right to Demand Insured Amount
Even after the insured events have occurred, if the insurer has terminated the contract under the provisions of
Articles 650-653, it is not liable for paying the insured amount the may demand the return of the insured amount
which has been already paid: Provided, that this shall not apply when it was proved that the occurrence of the insured
events was not affected by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation or by a substantial alteration or increase of the
risks insured. 
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exclude its own liability to pay the insured amount. However, if the policyholder or
insured proves that there is no causation whatsoever between the violation of the above
obligation and the occurrence of the insurance event, he/she may receive the insured
amount in accordance with the insurance contract.15)
iii.  Analysis 
However, such criticism of the Supreme Court decision is overly technical. Giving
the unlicensed driver the chance to change his/her position, even upon violation of law,
by requiring the existence of causation, would provoke more serious ethical problems
in addition to the anti-social aspect that the act of unlicensed driving inherently
possesses. The Korean automobile insurance policy defines the condition of exclusion
of unlicensed driving to apply only to ‘loss arising from unlicensed driving’, but it does
not mention ‘loss caused by unlicensed driving’. Accordingly, this may be construed as
to not require the existence of causation between unlicensed driving and an accident.
The Road Traffic Act prohibits unlicensed driving and imposes criminal sanctions for
the violation. People recognize that unlicensed driving is hazardous conduct
constituting a crime. Under this situation, a policy not providing for compensation for
accidents arising from such criminal conduct would not be construed as unreasonable.
Accordingly, the exclusion of unlicensed driving shall not be interpreted as applicable
to a limited case only for the causation between unlicensed driving and an insured
event. Rather, if compensation is to be made even when there is no causation between
the accident and unlicensed driving, a criminal act, then this is, to some extent, an act
which encourages or instigates the criminal act. 
4. Position of the Supreme Court 
In the past, the Supreme Court held that unlicensed driving is applicable to the
grave violation of pertinent laws, therefore accidents arising under such a violation of
laws shall be excluded from insurance compensation, whoever the subject of the
driving. On the other hand, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 659 of Commercial
15) Won-kyu Rhyu, previous article, pp. 436 and pp. 441-442; Supreme Court Decision; December 24, 1991, 90
Daka 23899, separate opinion 
An Analysis of the Controversial Exclusion Clauses under Korean Automobile Insurance Policy
130
Law as defining the exclusion based on the cause of loss. Therefore, in the event of
unlicensed driving, a circumstance at the time of having the losses (not the cause of the
losses), the Supreme Court held that any attempt to limit this condition of the exclusion
to the policyholder, insured or a driver hired by them, would be neglecting the purpose
of the exclusion clause, and it deemed such limitation as unjust.16)
Thereafter, the Supreme Court stated its position by contending that the limited
interpretation following the subject of unlicensed driving was still unjust. However, a
crucial change was made by the Court. It held that the exclusion clause of unlicensed
driving in relation to the scope of application would be an unfair interpretation, if it
were applicable to cases of unlicensed driving without the control or management of
the policyholder or insured. In other words, the Supreme Court’s position was that of a
need to change the interpretation that the exclusion clause of unlicensed driving was a
provision applicable only to situations where the policyholder or insured may control
or manage the circumstances. Consequently, the Court held that unlicensed driving that
was conducted in a situation where the policyholder or insured might control or
manage means that the unlicensed driving was conducted under the express or implied
consent of the policyholder or insured.17) Here, the case indicated that the subject of
approval (consent) is not the act of driving itself, but the ‘act of unlicensed driving’.18)
Therefore, even if the insured or policyholder approved the driving by the driver,
without knowing that the driver did not have a license, the application of the exclusion
policy would be impossible. This is the present position of the Court. 
In this case, implied consent is interpreted as limiting the cases to have the
inference of the intent of approval of the unlicensed driving to those that may be
equivalent to express consent. In general, it is conceivable that there is an implied
consent for persons who would have easy access to the applicable vehicle, such as
family members, relatives or employees of the policyholder or insured. However, a
determination of whether the unlicensed driving was performed under the implied
consent of the insurance policyholder or insured should be based upon consideration of
the overall situation, including the relationship of the policyholder or insured with the
16) Supreme Court Decision; June 26, 1990, 89 Daka 28287 
17) Supreme Court Decision; April 23, 1999, 98 Da 61395; Supreme Court Decision; March 27, 1998, 97 Da
6308; Supreme Court Decision; September 12, 1997, 97 Da19298 
18) Supreme Court Decision; November 23, 1993, 93 Da 41549 
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unlicensed driver, circumstances surrounding the operation and management of the
vehicle during normal times of operation, the context leading to the unlicensed driving
and the attitude of the policyholder or insured on the operation of the vehicle by the
unlicensed driver as well as the purpose of operation and others. 
The scope of application of the exclusion clause for such unlicensed driving has
been narrowed in comparison to its scope of application in the past. However, the
requirement of causation between the unlicensed driving and the accident concerned is
still not required. The general tendency of the Supreme Court is to make a relatively
strict interpretation of the implied consent of the policyholder or insured so that, in the
event of unlicensed driving by a third party, the exclusion for unlicensed driving may
be strictly applied to such case. 
5. Supreme Court’s Decision on Consent of Approved Insured 19) and Criticism 
a)  Facts 
A, the owner of a cargo vehicle, registered the vehicle under the name of the
company (B) and provided the vehicle for the company’s business. A was responsible
for the hiring of a driver, payment of the driver’s salary, entering into the automobile
insurance contract, vehicle maintenance and others. The company (B) entered into the
contract with A to pay for the transportation expenses for the cargo it carried. A
entered into the comprehensive automobile insurance contract with the insurer as a
business vehicle for carrying cargo. The company (B) was registered as a primary
insured. A allowed a person (C) who did not have the requisite driver’s license to drive
the cargo vehicle, and C was involved in an accident while driving the insured vehicle. 
b)  Courts’ Decisions 
The lower court based its decision on the fact that the unlicensed driver (C) was the
company’s driver, the cargo vehicle in the accident was in the ownership of the
defendant company (B), and the unlicensed driver (C) was an approved insured under
19) Supreme Court Decision; May 30, 2000, 99 Da 66236 
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the insurance contract. The lower court found that the unlicensed driving in this case
was performed by the insured himself. Therefore, the question of consent of the
insured was not a crucial factor. Under this situation, the lower court recognized the
application of the exclusion clause for unlicensed driving.20)
However, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion clause for unlicensed driving
was not applicable by interpreting the case as an accident occurring while driving
unlicensed under the consent of the vehicle owner A, who was the approved insured.
In other words, the Court was interpreting the case as one in which the unlicensed
driving under the sole consent of the approved insured was not applicable to a case of
possible control or management of the insured. This was because the approved insured
would not have the authority to allow a third person to use and drive the vehicle, in
principle. In addition, it is deemed unreasonable for the policyholder or the registered
insured to lose the right to claim the insured amount only based on the fact of the
consent by a person without such authority.21)
c)  Criticism 
In regards to the case where control or management of the insured was possible, it
shall be interpreted as including all situations of control or management of the
registered insured, approved insured and persons driving vehicles on their behalf. In
other words, if unlicensed driving was done under the express or implied consent of
the registered insured, approved insured or drivers on their behalf, the exclusion clause
for unlicensed driving should be applied, depending on the circumstances. The reason
is that these circumstances are all entail positions where they are insured under the
automobile insurance policy, and persons in such positions would have the obligation
not to permit driving by an unlicensed driver. 
In the above case, the driver who was involved in the accident while driving the
cargo vehicle shall be deemed as the insured under the automobile insurance contract
according to Section 5 of Article 12 of the Korean Automobile Insurance Policy, and
the circumstances of this accident would be interpreted as falling within the case of
20) Busan High Court Decision; October 14, 1999, 98 Na 12591 
21) Same objective: Supreme Court Decision; December 21, 1993, 91 Da 36420; Supreme Court Decision; May
24, 1994, 94 Da 11019 
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unlicensed driving by the insured himself. In other words, based on the fact that the
unlicensed driver was the company’s driver and that the cargo vehicle was the property
of the defendant company, the person committing the unlicensed driving would be
considered an approved insured, eligible for treatment as the insured under the
insurance contract. Therefore, such case would fall under the case where the insured
himself committing the unlicensed driving, and accordingly, the issue of whether the
consent of the insured was given to the person other than the insured would be
irrelevant. 
The interpretation of the Supreme Court, that the exclusion clause for unlicensed
driving cannot be applied to the case where there is only consent of the approved
insured, since this would not fall under the case where the unlicensed driving could be
controlled or managed by the registered insured, may leave room for criticism. It is
asserted that the Court neglected the principle of insurance law on the exclusion clause
for unlicensed driving. The Court’s interpretation should be interpreted flexibly. 
B.  Exclusion Clause of Driving While Intoxicated 
1. Policy Provision 
Under Section 7 of Clause 1 of Article 11 of the Korean Automobile Insurance
Policy, it states that “In the event of having an accident when the insured himself was
driving while intoxicated or the driver of the insured vehicle was driving while
intoxicated under the express or implied consent of the insured, 2 million won (around
$1700-contribution money) from the insured amount is excluded. However, in the
event that the insured has not paid the contribution money for accident resulting from
driving while intoxicated because of economic and/or other reasons, the insurer may
pay the damages including the contribution money to the victim first and claim the
payment of the contribution money against the insured. In such a case the insured shall
immediately pay for any accident resulting from driving while intoxicated to the
insurer.” This policy provision was newly amended in August of 2001. 
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2. Issue of Validity of Exclusion Clause 
The exclusion clause for driving while intoxicated looks to the violation of lawby
considering whether the cause of an accident was the act itself of driving while
intoxicated, and it considers the fact that the law was violated in driving while
intoxicated at the time of the accident as a cause of exclusion from the subject of
compensation of the insured. This is the cause for excluding from the subject of
compensation by the insurer. Therefore, its validity has been acknowledged, because
defining the condition for exclusion with the circumstances at the time of the loss
occurrence, regardless of the cause for such loss occurrence, would not fall under
Article 659 of Commercial Law. Such a logical conclusion is consistent with the case
previously described concerning unlicensed driving. 
3. Definition of Driving While Intoxicated 
Driving while intoxicated is considered as the consumption of alcohol in excess of
the limit (0.05%) of blood alcohol density defined under Article 41 of the Traffic Road
Act and Article 31 of Enforcement Decree of the Traffic Road Act. In the case of
driving while intoxicated, as in the case of unlicensed driving, it is irrelevant whether
the actual drinking of alcohol was an impediment to the driving. In the event the
police’s determination of the blood-alcohol density level is not relied upon, the
determination of exclusion of the insurer shall be determined by comprehensive
examination of the hospital record, record of examination for liver function,
confirmation of the doctor or nurse, and others. According to a recent case, a respiratory
measurement is an indirect measurement method for the blood-alcohol density level in
that the machine has a margin of error, with the possibility of discrepancies depending
on the physical condition of each person and the possibility of faulty operation or
breakdown of the machine. Considering such risks, Clause 3 of Article 41 of the Road
Traffic Act states that the measurement may be re-performed by blood sampling with
the consent of the driver, should the driver disagree with the original measurement. 
In the case of driving while intoxicated, the ‘driving’ refers to the use of a vehicle
in accordance with its generally intended purpose for use on the road. And the
Supreme Court has declared that even the act of moving a car in reverse for 1 meter,
while the vehicle is parked in the alley of a residential area for parallel parking, would
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be considered ‘driving’ as contemplated under the Road Traffic Act, even if such
‘driving’ is performed whilst parking or repositioning the car in a differentmanner.22)
Furthermore, an issue arose as to whether it was valid to refuse to have the sobriety test
performed, since the test was apparently not strictly applicable to circumstances falling
under the Road Traffic Act. The Court found that if a parking lot where a person was
driving the vehicle was adjacent to a restaurant, and this was a place provided for
people using the restaurant, where it was not possible for the general public or vehicles
to have free access to such place, the parking space would not be deemed the ‘road’ for
purposes of the Road Traffic Act.23) The basis for this determination is that the
intoxicated and unlicensed driving under the Road Traffic Act can only be established
while the driver is on the ‘road’ as defined under the Road Traffic Act. Therefore, if a
parking lot where a person drove the vehicle would not be accessible to other places
and it was a place used as a parking lot for customers who gained access to the
restaurant, then such a place would not under the Road Traffic Act. 
4. Contribution Money to the Accidents of Driving While Intoxicated 
This exclusion clause is different from other exclusion clauses in that it recognizes
a requirement of the insured to pay an amount of 2 million won (around $1700) and
the insurer to be liable for the balance amount. If a full exclusion is available, this may
raise an issue regarding the proper protection of victims. Therefore, the exclusion
system based on partial insurance  was introduced. The customary practice of the
insurance industry has been to make compensation with the exception of 2 million
won deducted from the amount originally paid by the insurance company for accidents
occurring while driving while intoxicated under the Bodily Injury Liability II. The
excluded amount was left for the offender, and if the offender, the person driving while
intoxicated, was incapable of making the payment, the insurance company would pay
the victim first and be indemnified by the offender. Such customary practice was
specified in writing with the revision of policy as of August 2001. 
22) Supreme Court Decision; June 22, 1993, 93 Do 828 
23) Supreme Court Decision; Jan. 19, 2001, 2000 Do 2763 and Supreme Court Decision; April 27, 2001, 2001
Do 817 
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5. Scope of Express or Implied Consent 
The main parties to situations of for driving while intoxicated include the insured
person and persons driving the vehicle of the insured under the express and implied
consent of the insured. In relation to express and implied consent, the express or
implied consent of policyholder or insured is required. As to provisions in policies
regarding the subject of the express or implied consent of the insured, such consent
must include the ‘driving action’ or and the ‘driving while intoxicated’. Accordingly,
when the driver who committed the act of driving while intoxicated under the express
or implied consent of the insured to the intoxicated driving itself, the insurer is
excluded from liability, and if the insured did not consent expressly or impliedly to the
intoxicated driving but simply consented to the act of driving at the time of the
consent, the insurer is held liable for compensation. 
On this issue, an argument exists that, considering the social ill-effect of driving
while intoxicated, the subject of express and implied consent should be interpreted to
be limited to consent of the ‘driving activity’ in order for the insurer to be excluded
from liability. However, this has provoked criticism that it would over-expand the
application of the exclusion clause for driving while intoxicated. At the time of the
occurrence of the insured event, the application of the exclusion clause would be fair
only in cases when there was a possibility that the insured may reallocate its liability
onto the insurer. When the insured only gives consent to the ‘driving activity’, the
exclusion of insurer’s liability for the unexpected driving while intoxicated would not
be construed as reasonable. 
III. Condition for Exclusion Clauses for Unlicensed or Driving 
While Intoxicated Personal Accident Insurance
A.  Raising the Issue 
Article 659 of Commercial Law states that the insurer does not have responsibility
for payment of the insurance amount in the case where the insured event occurs due to
the intentional or gross negligence of the policyholder. However, Articles 732-224) and
24) Article 732-2 Insurance Risks caused by Gross Negligence 
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 3, No.1, 2003
137
739 25) of the same Act state that the insurer shall have the responsibility for payment of
the insurance amount even when the insured event occurs due to the gross negligence
of the policyholder, insured or insurance beneficiary under life insurance and personal
accident insurance. Moreover, Article 663 26) of the same Act states that the regulations
related to the insurance under the Commercial Law may not be changed to
disadvantageous the policyholder or insurance beneficiary without the special
agreement of the parties. (Principle of prohibiting disadvantageous changes; relative
imperative provision) 
With such a regulation, under the interpretation of the Insurance Act, property
insurance (compensation insurance) allows  for exclusion of the insurer in the event of
accidents caused intentionally or by gross negligence of the insured. However, in the
case of life insurance or accident insurance, the insurer is excluded only in the event of
an accident caused intentionally, while the insurer would be liable for an accident
caused by gross negligence of the insured, which would include the case of ordinary
negligence. Furthermore, in the event of property insurance (compensation insurance)
such as Bodily Injury Liability II, the insurer is excluded under Article 659 of
Commercial Law for an accident caused by gross negligence, and in the event of
accidents related to unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated, the law appears to
recognize exclusion based upon gross negligence even without the intent that there be
no difficulty of excluding the insurer. In addition, the life insurance does not even
require that the accident occur during the unlicensed driving or driving while
intoxicated as a condition for exclusion. 
Therefore, the subject matter for the following discussion is the exclusion clause
under the accident insurance policy. Article 732-2 of Commercial Law requires only
an intentional accident as a condition for the exclusion, and this provision is relatively
In the case of an insurance contract covering death as an insured event, the insurer shall not be discharged from
its liability, even though the insured event happens by reason of gross negligence of the policyholder, insured, or
beneficiary. 
25) Article 739 Applicable Provisions 
The provisions concerning life insurance except Article 732 shall apply mutatis mutandis to accident insurance 
26) Article 663 Prohibitions of Entering Special Agreement which is Disadvantageous to Policyholder, etc. 
The provisions of this Part(Chapter 1 of Insurance Law) shall not be changed as being disadvantageous to the
policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary through an agreement by the parties: Provided, That this shall not apply
in the case of reinsurance, marine insurance and other similar types of insurance. 
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imperative under Article 663 of Commercial Law. Therefore, there has been ongoing
dispute over whether or not a policy provision recognizing the exclusion of the insurer
would be valid in relation to Article 663 of Commercial Law and Article 732-2 of
Commercial Law where the accident involving unlicensed driving or driving while
intoxicated would be proof of intent of the insured, although the insured had the intent
to engage in unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated. This issue has led to the
issue of unconstitutionality of Article 732-2 of Commercial Law. In addition, there is a
question as to whether the Article 663 of Commercial Law’s mentioning Article 732-2
of Commercial Law as a relative imperative provision is reasonable. 
Insurance companies have exclusion clauses for accidents arising in the course of
driving while intoxicated and unlicensed driving in relation to personal accident
insurance provisions of automobile insurance policies. The Supreme Court has
continuously rendered such policies as void in light of the provisions of the Commercial
Law.27) However, in spite of the series of cases rendered by the Court, insurance
companies continue to maintain such exclusion provisions. On December 23, 1999, the
Constitutional Court held that Article 732-2 of Commercial Law does not violate the
Constitutional Law and denied the validity of exclusion clauses for unlicensed driving
and driving while intoxicated under such accident insurance policies.28) Such a decision
upholding the constitutionality of the Commercial Law has at last brought about a
change in such policy clauses. From April 2000, exclusions on unlicensed driving and
driving while intoxicated are to be omitted from accident insurance provisions of
automobile insurance policies. However, the Constitutional Court’s decision raises
many questions in, especially in consideration of the problem of moral hazard inherent
in insurance contracts, the general principles for interpretation of accident insurance
provisions and in light of a comparative look at similar foreign laws. 
B.  Basis of Decision of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
First, the rationale for Article 732-2 of Commercial Law’s not recognizing the
exclusion of the insurer’s liability for accidents arising not as a result of an intentional
27) Supreme Court Decision; April 26, 1996, 96 Da 4909; Supreme Court Decision; April 28, 1998, 98 Da 4330;
Supreme Court Decision; February 12, 1999, 98 Da 26910 
28) For the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 99 Hunga 3; 99 Hunba 50; 99 Hunba 52; 99 Hunba 62. 
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act is that the Court wants to protect the policyholder in light of the risk to life and
body in the event of an accident. Therefore, gross negligence is excluded from the
condition for the exclusion. Second, even if the insured event occurs due to gross
negligence of the insured, the act itself is not considered interfere with the rise of an
insured event or to bring about a moral hazard. Third, the legislative intent was to
preserve the economic security of the surviving family members, the fairness of which
is recognized by Article 732-2 of Commercial Law, and this is not deemed to interfere
with the freedom to engage in business activities or in the freedom of contract. Fourth,
in of comparison with the relative position of the insurer with many personnel, a
physical organization and business sophistication, the policyholder is considered to be
in a much more vulnerable position. As such, the parties to an insurance contract are
not afforded the complete right to private autonomy, and it is generally recognized as
the right of the government to partially intervene in the insurance business, in varying
degrees. Fifth, although the difference between an accident caused by gross negligence
and an accident caused by mere negligence is relative, the resulting impact may be
greatly different. An actual differentiation between gross negligence and ordinary
negligence is actually a very difficult task. If an exclusion is recognized even in the
case of gross negligence, the insurer is surely likely to be exempt from its payment
responsibility by applying its own favorable interpretation, which would provoke
ceaseless disputes on the difference between gross negligence and mere negligence. 
For the foregoing reasons, the interpretation for exclusion clauses in relation to
unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated in accident insurance provisions do not
have to be similarly interpreted as in the case of liability insurance provisions. In
addition, unlicensed driving and driving while intoxicated are intentional criminal acts,
but unless there are special circumstances, the intent requirement is that of the act of
unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated and not the resulting death or injury
itself. Therefore, this is not necessarily contrary to the morality or ethics of the person
in the insurance contract even if damage compensation is to be made. 
C.  Criticism 
An accident must occur as a pre-condition to triggering the insurance provisions,
and the insured amount to be received in the event of an insured event is much greater
than the premium that the policyholder pays under the insurance policy. Therefore, the
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risk of moral hazard is ever present. Unlicensed driving and driving while intoxicated
are typical moral hazards related to insurance provisions. The payment of the insured
amount to persons engaged in such actions are self-destructive events which
undermine the insurance system, and consequently, causes damage to good-faith
policyholders. 
Unlicensed driving and driving while intoxicated are not simply violations of traffic
laws, but are criminal actions characterized by anti-social behavior. The recognition
that unlicensed driving and driving while intoxicated are serious anti-social criminal
acts has been recognized throughout society. It is a generally recognized fact in
civilized societies that a license should be required to operate a vehicle and that driving
while intoxicated should be a prohibited act. Society further recognizes that protection
by way of insurance coverage for persons who have violated such established norms
deviates from fundamental principles underlying the modern insurance system. Such
insurance coverage may significantly encourage further acts of unlicensed driving and
driving while intoxicated. The death rate from traffic accidents related to unlicensed
driving would be twice that the death rate of ordinary traffic accidents, and according
to the 1999 combined rate for accidents related to unlicensed driving and driving while
intoxicated, the number of such accidents reached approximately 13% of all accidents
occurred and approximately 20% of the number of death cases.29) The Constitutional
Court also pointed out the concern of preventing  such illegal activities, which are
contrary to social norms. 
Following the current case of the Supreme Court and the decision of the
Constitutional Court, the insurer’s exclusion from  liability is impossible for personal
accident insurance related to unlicensed driving and driving while intoxicated.
Therefore, insurance companies will undoubtedly reflect such restrictions into its
calculation of insurance premiums.30) In other words, the application of higher
premiums unilaterally, even against innocent policyholders that exhibit little or no
probability of engaging in unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated may violate
have a high probability of violating the equal protection clause under the Constitution.
Insured drivers who are involved in accidents without fulfilling the fundamental
29) Data: 2000 Road Traffic Safety White Book, National Police Agency 
30) After the revision of policy in April 2000, the net insurance premium rate of personal accident insurance was
increased for 8.2%. 
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obligation of obtaining a driver’s license or causing the accident to occur by driving
while intoxicated-which have proportionately high accident rates-should not have the
benefit of insurance policies. Such exclusion would be in accord with the interest of
good faith and ethical standards characterizing the insurance system and in the interest
of risk homogeneity within the insurance group. There is no reason to protect such
insured drivers with insurance funds, which are reserved with proceeds contributed by
other innocent policyholders. 
If the position of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, that the validity of
an exclusion clause should be recognized only in the event of an intent to bring about
the occurrence of injury or death, is to be defended, exclusion clauses other than
unlicensed driving or driving while intoxicated that are defined under the personal
accident insurance policy-for example, dangerous exercises including climbing,
skydiving, scuba diving and others, surgeries including the birth and miscarriage of the
insured-are inapplicable. This means that the existence of personal accident insurance
may be jeopardized. Because it is very rare for the insured to take action applicable to
the condition for the exclusion that is defined by personal accident insurance with the
intent on the result, and even if such a case is present, proof of intent is extremely
difficult. 
From a comparative law perspective, countries with advanced insurance systems
define driving while intoxicated under personal accident insurance policy as a
condition qualifying the insurer for exclusion. In general, such countries do not require
causation between the driving while intoxicated and the accident. For example, in
personal accident cases in Japan, the accident involving the insured himself/herself is
the condition for exclusion when the insured drives a vehicle without a license under
the relevant law, or when the insured drives the insured vehicle under the situation
where he/she is unable to drive normally because of the influence of alcohol, drugs,
marijuana, anti-hypnotic drugs and others.31) In addition, the insurer is excluded even
without causation between drinking and others being injured. 
In the case of the US, the exclusion clause of driving while intoxicated on personal
accident insurance, such as group health insurance and others, is valid. The New York
Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act, as amended in 1995, is
known to have a significant influence on the Insurance Act of each state, and the
31) Section 2 of Clause 1 of Article 3 of Chapter 2 of Comprehensive Insurance Policy on Personal Automobile 
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exclusion clause for driving while intoxicated is valid for personal accident insurance
policies.32) In the case of England, there is no automobile insurance standard policy but
the exclusion clause for driving while intoxicated can be established by each insurer,
with the court recognizing its effectiveness. The approach of these advanced countries
have the tendency of strengthening control over unlicensed driving and driving while
intoxicated. For example, some states in the US will convict a driver for first-degree
murder, and it is a felony, which may bring a life prison sentence in the case of driving
a vehicle while intoxicated accompanied by a car accident resulting in the death of
persons. Japan also deems a ‘dangerous driving manslaughter’ if a death results from
an accident while driving intoxicated. A 15-year’s imprisonment may be imposed. 
Compared to these countries, in Korea where the rate of traffic accidents is among
the highest in the world, and with the serious ill-effects of unlicensed and driving
while intoxicated 33), there have been recent calls for criminal and administrative
regulations as well as insurance sanctions for such actions. The recent positions of the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, however, clearly pose significant
problems. 
As described earlier, the exclusion clause for driving while intoxicated and
unlicensed driving in property insurance shall be interpreted effectively following the
circumstantial exclusion theory, and it only limits the actual application of an exclusion
clause by additionally proposing the standard of ‘control and management possibility’.
On the other hand, the standard shall differ in the event of personal accident insurance.
It is interpreted as void based on the content control under Commercial Law and
deletes the exclusion clause for unlicensed and driving while intoxicated in personal
accident insurance provisions under automobile insurance policies. Such a dual
interpretation sometimes produces unreasonable results in some instances. For
example, in Bodily Injury Liability insurance, the victim who, without any
responsibility, may be refused payment of insured money due to the application of an
32) 5103(b)(2). However, the standard automobile insurance policy of the US does not have the exclusion
clause on driving while intoxicated. 
33) The ratio of the number of accidents caused by the driving while intoxicated from the entire traffic accident
increased from 2.9% in 1990 to 9.3% in 1997, more than 3 times. For the death from the foregoing accidents, it was
3.1% in 1990 that was increased to 8.7% in 1997 for nearly 3 times of increase. (Data: Statistics of Traffic Accident,
1998 Ed. pp. 94, National Police Agency) 
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exclusion clause, even in the case of an accident caused by gross negligence of the
insured (wrongdoer). However, the insured responsible for the accident arising from
gross negligence would receive an insured amount from the personal accident
insurance, the insured being the beneficiary of the insurance contract. This is duly
unreasonable.
D.  Theory of Legislation (Amendment) and Conclusion 
As to the current provisions of Article 732-2 and Article 633 of Commercial Law,
such provisions should be interpreted imperative provisions that do not permit
exclusion of the insurer’s liability on the basis of accidents caused by grossly negligent
conduct in personal accident insurance cases. However, due to several problems
including its possible unconstitutionality as pointed out earlier, there appears to be a
need for review of Article 633, which makes Article 732-2 of Commercial Law an
imperative provision,. In particular, unlike the current legal provision, the imperative
regulation should only be applied in individual cases , and the provision should be
reviewed for ways to exclude Article 732-2 of Commercial Law as a imperative
provision. 34) Under the present legal provisions, it is conceivable that the general
provisions in the Insurance Act be made to exclude the insurer for cases of unlicensed
driving and driving while intoxicated under personal accident insurance. Ultimately, as
pointed out by the Constitutional Court, the protective function performed by the
national authorities governing the insurance industry shall be lessened gradually.
Therefore, in relation to the interpretation of exclusion clauses on unlicensed driving or
driving while intoxicated in the context of personal accident insurance, the scope of
private autonomy in regards to the insured event caused by gross negligence shall
broaden. 
34) Kyung-Whan Chang, Analysis on the decisions of unconstitutionality of exclusion clauses for unlicensed and
driving while intoxicated , in Non-Life Insurance, February, 2000, pp. 15-24 
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